The case of the drowning child helps us to recognise and explore our own ethical inconsistencies and to challenge both our beliefs and our behaviours. If we would make small personal sacrifices to help someone in need right in front of us, why would we not always do the same for someone further away? Why are our actions not always consistent with our beliefs?
The case of the drowning child – posed by Australian philosopher Peter Singer – brings us face to face with inconsistencies in the ways we determine the boundaries of our own moral responsibilities. Why, if we say we would always jump into a pond to save a child drowning in front of us at the negligible cost of ruining our clothes, do we not always make small sacrifices to care for children dying of famine in far flung countries?
Almost everyone faced with the drowning child problem claims that they would of course save the child in the pond, and that a small sacrifice such as clothing is an insignificant factor in their decision. The vast majority of people also claim that distance is not a significant factor, so if we were able to sacrifice our clothing here to save a child drowning far away the same feeling of obligation to save the child should apply.
This thinking device probes into uncomfortable areas of our everyday behaviours. It asks us to question not just why we might choose to do the right thing, but also why we very often choose not to do other good things which we could, and perhaps should do. Are we responsible only for actions taken, or also for actions we are capable of taking but do not? The ancient Greek word akrasia describes the condition of acting against one’s better judgement. Very often we know what the right thing to do is, and are capable of doing this, yet we still choose not to do so. The case of the drowning child invites us to explore our reasons and justifications for this everyday akrasia.
Should we feel guilty when we do not help someone who we could have helped? Where does this stop? Surely we cannot help everyone in need? Do we have greater responsibility for those near to us, or to those who are like us: family, neighbour, social class, ethnic group? Can we find an acceptable balance and come to terms with the realisations that we may not be able to help everyone, but that we almost certainly can help more people than we currently do. How should we change our behaviours? Where should we position the boundaries and reasonable limitations on our obligations and duties to care for others?
In the design context, this thinking device challenges us to consider where the boundaries of design’s responsibilities to care for others might lie, and to examine our inner motivations for why as designers we might act in ways which contravene our personal principles.
*Further Reading
Singer, P. (1997). The Drowning Child and the Expanding circle. New Internationalist, (289), 28–30.
Singer, P. (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3), 229–243.
Singer, P. (2005). Ethics and Intuitions. The Journal of Ethics, 9(3–4), 331–352.