Category: Thought Experiments

How could we design the fairest possible world for everyone living in it, considering that each individual has unique and differing needs, that there are finite limits to the resources we must all share, and that we hold a vast range of divergent and conflicting beliefs, principles and perspectives about what a good society would be?

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American political philosopher John Rawls’ proposed the idea of the “original position”, inviting us to imagine a procedure for producing a truly ‘just’ society (fair for all) that could be accepted by all, rather than having to be enforced by power. The original position is a hypothetical point of view from which any rational person would come to the same conclusions about the basic organising principles of society. Rawls suggests that this position of consensus could be reached if we were able to step outside of our own biases and self-interests, as if  stepping behind a “veil of ignorance”. Behind the veil, we are asked to consider how best to ensure justice throughout society by distributing a fair balance of basic social goods such as rights, liberties, duties, powers, opportunities, income and wealth. Having no knowledge of our own identities and personal desires, this deliberation must be shaped only by the ability to think rationally, knowledge of the various competing conceptions of justice within ethical theory, and a basic knowledge of general facts about the physical world and human psychology and behaviour.

Perhaps the biggest challenge of creating a just society is the challenge of diversity. Humans have many common needs and desires, but also an incredible range of specific niche and individual requirements, some of which directly conflict with the needs and desires of others. How do we prioritise whose needs to fulfil? The trick of the veil of ignorance, is that though it denies us knowledge of our own position in society it still leverages the motivation of our personal self-interest, only now in relation to all possible positions. We know that we will exist somewhere in society, but we do not know who we will be and where we will find ourselves when we emerge from behind the veil. Under such conditions it is rational to act in the self-interest of all parties. Therefore, Rawls maintains that it would make sense to distribute social goods in such a way that they produce the best possible outcomes for the worst off in society. If the worst possible position in society is as good as it can be (considering the limitations of natural resources) then we have protected our own self-interest, and the self-interest of all other members of the society. To choose to privilege certain groups over others in the hopes of being one of the lucky ones would be a very risky strategy. While the gamble may or may not pay off for you individually (would you take this risk?), Rawls argues that such a choice would lead to an unsustainable outcome. Any society which begins with a structural injustice affecting a whole sector of its population will be unstable in the long-term. These unjust structures will inevitably require enforcement by persuasion and power rather continuing to be accepted through rational consensus.

While Rawls’ conception of the original position is specifically intended to address the overtly political question of the organisation of societies, it is an interesting experiment to apply this thinking device to the activity of design. Just as in the political realm, designers are often faced with difficult balancing acts, having to decide whose needs and desires to prioritise.

What would it mean to practice design with justice for all? What might this look like and how could this be achieved?

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*Further Reading

Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bianchin, M., & Heylighen, A. (2017). Just design. Design Studies, 54, 1–22. 

Freeman, S. “Original Position”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = plato.stanford.edu

Design is a future-oriented activity. How can we best care for/minimise harm to others in the future? The Non-Identity problem draws our attention to the complexity of attempts to  make judgements about the future consequences of our actions today.

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Philosopher Derek Parfit’s Non-Identity problem forces us to think carefully about how we conceive of our responsibilities to future humans. Parfit starts with the case of a prospective mother faced with the choice either to conceive a child now, whose life will be negatively affected by a certain disability, or to wait and conceive a child at a future date who would be born without this impairment. At first glance this seems like a relatively straightforward calculation. The situation of the baby conceived now would be inferior to that of the baby conceived later. From a consequentialist perspective the optimal outcome can be achieved by waiting. However, the scenario becomes much more complex when we realise that we are talking about two entirely different children, neither of whom yet exists. To choose one is to deny the other existence. It is difficult to argue that the mother would be harming the child conceived now by giving it life, even if this life is slightly impaired. Surely a good, though perhaps imperfect, life is better than no life at all?

To fully illustrate the counter-intuitive insights afforded by this thinking device, Parfit develops the scenario to consider the implications of contemporary global resource use on future populations. Parfit’s thought experiment problematically and provocatively demonstrates an argument that no specific person is actually harmed when we make decisions today which negatively impact the imagined lives of potential future populations. A major policy shift, for example the decision to rapidly increase use of fossil fuels, would change working patterns, relationships, children conceived. Within a few generations the future population will be a completely alternative set of humans. These new future humans’ living conditions may be worse than they might have otherwise been due to environmental damage and resource scarcity but it can be argued that these specific humans have not themselves technically been harmed. Surely a good, though perhaps imperfect, life is better than no life at all?

The Non-Identity problem raises difficult questions and does not provide simple answers. Can a course of action still be said to be wrong, even if it is not wrong in relation to anyone in particular? What do we do when our intuitions are strongly opposed to logical reasoning? 

What it does offer is a critique of the use of simplistic consequentialist reasoning in our attempts to consider the implications of activity which aims to influence the future. Trying to calculate total or average levels of happiness in a hypothetical future population may be a fools errand. For designers, whose work is to bring the future into being, how are we to proceed?

In the design context, the Non-Identity Problem challenges us to consider the nature of design’s responsibility towards future humans: whether this is a responsibility to not-harm, or to care, and what the difference and implications of this might be.

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*Further Reading

Parfit, D. (1976). On doing the best for our children. In M. Bayles (Ed.), Ethics and Population (pp. 100–115). Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman.

Roberts, M. A., “The Nonidentity Problem”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = plato.stanford.edu

Podcast Episode: Future People. The Philosopher’s Arms

(BBC Radio 4), Series 5, Episode 4.

The case of the drowning child helps us to recognise and explore our own ethical inconsistencies and to challenge both our beliefs and our behaviours. If we would make small personal sacrifices to help someone in need right in front of us, why would we not always do the same for someone further away? Why are our actions not always consistent with our beliefs?

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The case of the drowning child – posed by Australian philosopher Peter Singer – brings us face to face with inconsistencies in the ways we determine the boundaries of our own moral responsibilities. Why, if we say we would always jump into a pond to save a child drowning in front of us at the negligible cost of ruining our clothes, do we not always make small sacrifices to care for children dying of famine in far flung countries? 

Almost everyone faced with the drowning child problem claims that they would of course save the child in the pond, and that a small sacrifice such as clothing is an insignificant factor in their decision. The vast majority of people also claim that distance is not a significant factor, so if we were able to sacrifice our clothing here to save a child drowning far away the same feeling of obligation to save the child should apply.

This thinking device probes into uncomfortable areas of our everyday behaviours. It asks us to question not just why we might choose to do the right thing, but also why we very often choose not to do other good things which we could, and perhaps should do. Are we responsible only for actions taken, or also for actions we are capable of taking but do not? The ancient Greek word akrasia describes the condition of acting against one’s better judgement. Very often we know what the right thing to do is, and are capable of doing this, yet we still choose not to do so. The case of the drowning child invites us to explore our reasons and justifications for this everyday akrasia.

Should we feel guilty when we do not help someone who we could have helped? Where does this stop? Surely we cannot help everyone in need? Do we have greater responsibility for those near to us, or to those who are like us: family, neighbour, social class, ethnic group? Can we find an acceptable balance and come to terms with the realisations that we may not be able to help everyone, but that we almost certainly can help more people than we currently do. How should we change our behaviours? Where should we position the boundaries and reasonable limitations on our obligations and duties to care for others?

In the design context, this thinking device challenges us to consider where the boundaries of design’s responsibilities to care for others might lie, and to examine our inner motivations for why as designers we might act in ways which contravene our personal principles.

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*Further Reading

Singer, P. (1997). The Drowning Child and the Expanding circle. New Internationalist, (289), 28–30. 

Singer, P. (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3), 229–243.

Singer, P. (2005). Ethics and Intuitions. The Journal of Ethics, 9(3–4), 331–352.

The Trolley Problem helps us to become aware of, challenge, and interrogate our ethical intuitions. It reminds us that we cannot always rely on rules to tell us what the right thing to do in any situation is. By drawing this to our attention, the trolley problem helps us to prepare ourselves to face new challenges by helping us to realise that there are limits to ethical theory. This understanding can help us to be better prepared to be unprepared. 

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We think we know right from wrong. It all seems very clear. Black and white. Simple. Until reality happens, and nothing is as simple as we would like it to be. 

“Trolley problems” are philosophical thought experiments which play off two major approaches to ethics (deontology and consequentialism) against each other to expose some of the inconsistencies in our everyday ethical intuitions. The most famous version of the problem ask us to choose whether it would be right to divert a runaway tram car (train or ‘trolley’) onto a side-track to save the lives of five people at the cost of killing one person on the side-track. From a consequentialist perspective, all other things being equal, the right thing to do would appear to be to save the most lives. Five lives are better than one, and one death is preferable to five. The right thing to do is to follow the course of action which results in the best consequences. The means are justified by the ends. Consistently, the majority of people choose to sacrifice one to save five lives.

The trick up the sleeve of the trolley problem is to then present a second permutation of the first scenario. This second scenario offers a similar choice but one which intuitively feels very different to the first. While a majority of people normally would choose to pull a lever resulting in the death of one to save five lives, far fewer would choose to save five lives if the necessary action required was to become physically involved in the killing of one person. Deontological approaches to ethics hold that there are some principles, such as “do not kill” which apply universally in all situations. The consequences might be terrible, but terrible ends should not be used to justify terrible means. 

In one instance we maintain that it is better for one to die that five might live, but in another case we hold the opposite. 

The trolley problem challenges us to consider whether the means justify the ends, whether murder is always wrong, and what the difference is between killing, and letting die. It provokes and pushes us to examine our assumptions, to question what we see as black and white. It invites us to explore the possibility that in the world of ethics, everything might in fact be grey.

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*Further Reading

Foot, P. (1967). The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect. The Oxford Review, (5), 5–15.

Thomson, J. J. (1985). The Trolley Problem. The Yale Law Journal, 94(6), 1395–1415.

Podcast Episode: Trolleyology. The Philosopher’s Arms

(BBC Radio 4), Series 4, Episode 2.